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Motive-based enforcement  
 
Wim Voermans1 
 
‘There are not enough jails, not enough policemen, not even enough courts 
to enforce a law not supported by the people’  
 
Hubert H. Humphrey (vice-president USA 1964-1968) 
 
 
 
Abstract       
 
What can public authorities do in order to promote regulatory compliance? 
This paper argues that understanding the compliance motives is key to any 
enforcement strategy. Simply stepping up the enforcement effort or stiffen-
ing penalties is – most of the time – quite ineffective. Especially attempts at 
engineering criminal law rules to achieve a heightened deterrence effects 
will generally be ineffective, social science research suggests. And – much 
in the same vein – raising administrative enforcement efforts does not auto-
matically raise compliance rates proportionally. There is not a one-on-one 
relation between enforcement effort and compliance outcome, although this 
idea seems to be underpinning a lot of present-day enforcement strategies. 
Enforcement efforts are but one of the many norm-support cues to comply. 
Recent research rather suggests that a sort of bandwagon-effect exists as 
regards regulatory compliance. Compliant behaviour, or enforcement activi-
ties that reminds us of (or merely point out) the existence of a norm, prompt 
                                                 
1 Wim Voermans is Professor of Constitutional and Administrative law at Leiden 
University, Director of the Institute of Public Law at Leiden Law School and Presi-
dent of the International Association for Legislation. This contribution is loosely 
based on a speech I gave some years ago for the Dutch Association for Legislation, 
which I presided at the time. The speech was published in the annual conference pro-
ceedings of the Association. W. Voermans (2007), De aspirinewerking van sanction-
eren (The Aspirin Effect of Sanctioning), in: L. Loeber (ed.), Bruikbare wetgeving (Useful 
Legislation), preadviezen van Ph. Eijlander en P. Popelier aan de Vereniging voor 
wetgeving en wetgevingsbeleid. Wolff Legal Publishers: Nijmegen, p. 57-64.  
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(more) compliant behaviour. Designers of enforcement strategies need to 
keep this in mind.   
 
 
1. Compliance as a prerequisite for effective regulation 
 
Compliance is essential for the operation of regulation.2 Rules and regula-
tions that are not systematically observed are – in the end – pointless and 
futile. The overarching aim of all regulation is to have an effect on (social, 
economic, or institutional) behaviour;  to impact behaviour by means of 
legal effect. ‘To be authoritative’, Tom Tyler argues, ‘legal rules and deci-
sions must affect the actions of those toward whom they are directed.’3 If 
they do not, the authority of the legal rules themselves may be compro-
mised. Lon Fuller observes that: 
 
‘On the one hand, the lawgiver must be able to anticipate that the cit-
izenry as a whole will accept as law and generally observe the body 
of rules he has promulgated. On the other hand, the legal subject 
must be able to anticipate that government will itself abide by its 
own declared rules when it comes to judge his actions, as in decid-
ing, for example, whether he has committed a crime or claims prop-
erty under a valid deed. A gross failure in the realization of either of 
these anticipations - of government toward citizen and of citizen to-
ward government - can have the result that the most carefully drafted 
code will fail to become a functioning system of law.’4 
 
Compliance, in fact, is the double-edged sword of all regulation: it is crucial 
for the effect of law and it reinforces the authority of law, while  non-
compliance cripples the effectiveness of law and undermines the authority 
of it.  
 
                                                 
2 There is a wide variety of definitions of the concept of regulation. For this contribu-
tion I will use a very wide ranging definition of the concept of regulation and under-
stand it as every public or state-based (as opposed to market-based) intervention  in 
the form of a legal act of a general nature (i.e. not merely directed at one individual or 
a single event). 
3 Tom R. Tyler (2006), Why do People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press, p. 19. 
4 Lon L. Fuller (1969), Human Interaction and the Law, American  Journal of Jurispru-
dence (14) 1, p. 24.  
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As a result legal authorities all over the world are interested in securing 
compliance with the law, Tom Tyler notes  
 
‘legal authorities want to establish and maintain conditions lead the 
public generally their decisions and policies.’5  
 
This is not easy, because legal authorities cannot, as we all know from expe-
rience, take public compliance for granted.6 
 
How do public authorities set these conditions to inspire and optimize com-
pliance with regulations? What kind of problems do they face, what kind of 
standards are they subject to? What strategies do they employ? And can 
anything be said about the success of these strategies? Do best practices 
exist? These are the question that are central to this contribution. Before we 
deal with the standards, strategies, instruments and best practices of compli-
ance – in my experience in most cases the ill-advised starting point of policy 
debates on compliance – we need to understand why people (including insti-
tutions, market operators, etc.) comply with rules. Every compliance policy, 
strategy or instrument that fails to take the motives and attitudes of address-
ees into account, risks being ineffective in the end.7 
 
 
2. Understanding compliance: rational and constructivist compliance 
theories 
 
Why do people actually obey the law? A host of theories have attempted to 
solve this riddle.8 According to one line of thinking – one that is quite 
common in present-day administrative and regulatory practice – the answer 
to these questions is quite straightforward. It departs from the notion that the 
                                                 
5 Tyler (2006), p. 19.  
6 Tyler (2006), ibid. 
7 See also R.A.J. van Gestel (2013), De wetgever als keuzearchitect (Regulating as the 
art of choice architecture), RegelMaat (Journal for Legislative Studies (28), 1, p. 22-38. 
8 Most of these theories have originated in international law, an area of law where 
compliance is especially hard to enforce. Although originally devised to understand 
the behaviour of states, or state-based institutions these theories can also be used to 
gain a better understanding of (non)compliant behaviour of actual people. See for an 
overview Ronald B. Mitchell (1996), ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’ in: James 
Cameron, Jacob Werksman, 
and Peter Roderick, Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law. Earthscan 
1996, p. 3-28.  
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principle actor in compliance is the administration itself. Compliance with 
enacted regulation is inspired by a combination of due process when enact-
ing and proper communication of the rules (publication and promulgation) 
and making administrative efforts to ensure the acceptance of rules (by giv-
ing additional information, dialogue, monitoring, etc.) or other methods that 
could contribute to voluntary or ‘spontaneous’ compliance with these rules.9 
If compliance does not ensue, according to this line of thinking, the admin-
istration can be held to account. It needs to gather information with regard 
to compliance and non-compliance with the regulation (monitor & inspect) 
and react to nonconformity (enforce, sanction). This line of thinking 
branches out into two different perspectives on the issue in modern compli-
ance theory. The first is the rational perspective (believing that regulatory 
addressees are rational actors that weigh cost and benefits and believing 
therefore that only a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctioning will 
induce compliance, hence also known as the enforcement school).10 The 
second perspective is the management perspective which also perceives 
regulatory addressees as rational beings, but recognizing that non-
compliance is not always per se the result of deliberate defiance of the regu-
lation. It also occurs as a result of capacity limitations on the part of the ad-
dressee, as a result of ambiguity of rules, or involuntary and inadvertently 
for a number of other reasons.11 Non-compliant behaviour therefore does 
not always need to be ‘cured’, remedied or followed by administrative en-
forcement or sanctions, but may be secured by remedial forms of adminis-
trative action (information, administrative assistance, legislative simplifica-
tion, etc.)12 According to both perspectives though, compliance is largely 
dependent on administrative action. In the constructivist perspective – on 
the other hand – compliance is dependent on the way regulatory norms tie in 
with or align with the beliefs of the addressee. According to constructivist 
                                                 
9 This line of thinking can be found in the compliance toolbox the Dutch government 
uses, called the Table of 11. The number refers to the eleven dimensions of compli-
ance the instruments use as steps that help users to assess the chances of success of 
their compliance strategy of instrument. 
10 Jeffrey T. Checkel (2001), Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity 
Change, International Organization (55) 3, p. 555–557. See also Esther Versluis (2005), 
Compliance Problems in the EU; What potential role for agencies in securing compliance, Paper 
prepared for the 3rd ECPR General Conference, Budapest 2005. To be retrieved at: 
http://regulation.upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/eversluis.pdf  (last visited on 4 February 
2013). 
11 Versluis (2005), p. 8-9. 
12 Jonas Tallberg (2002). Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the 
European Union, International Organization, 56, p. 609-643, notably p. 613. 
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theory the main driver for the change of behaviour (or preferences) is not 
external (e.g. administrative action), but rather more the socialization or 
internalization of rules by the addressees.13 Internalization, as it were. So-
cialization and internationalization of rules, in turn, are predominantly 
brought about by persuasion and/or persuasive appeals to inner morality. If 
regulators succeed in convincing addressees that rules are right, good, nec-
essary, legitimate or whatever successful appeal can be made to the inner 
motivation or belief system of the addressee and spontaneous  compliance 
might ensue. And if we may believe the evidence our own eyes bring us, 
spontaneous compliance is the general effect in established liberal democra-
cies – at least in absolute terms - whatever persistent non-compliance  prob-
lems these political systems face. Versluis makes clear, however, that con-
structivism, on the other hand, does not  provide clear-cut short-term solu-
tions to solve compliance problems.14 Internalization and socialization, and 
thus compliance, will only take place in the long run; no quick fixes here.  
 
 
3. Implementation & enforcement: legal standards 
 
Although we do not want to dwell on legal theory too long, it would seem 
we must admit that in essence law is a ‘belief’ system. We abide by the law 
because we believe we have to and/or other members of our societies, or 
state actors remind us we ought to.15 Regulation uses the law as its vehicle 
and by that appeals to the beliefs of its addressees.16 In liberal democracies, 
based on the rule of law, the law system itself calls upon the public authori-
ties to act and to implement, i.e. guarantee the effect of law, if necessary by 
                                                 
13 Or as Raustalia and Slaughter put it: ‘From a constructivist perspective, compliance 
is less a matter of rational calculation or imposed constraints than of internalized iden-
tities and norms of appropriate behaviour.’ Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter 
(2002), ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’, in W. Carlsnaes, 
T. Risse & B.A. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations. Sage; London, p. 540.  
14 Versluis (2005), p. 11. 
15 These beliefs in turn are very important, because they are legitimate rules and gov-
ernment action is required to enforce them. If rules and government action is per-
ceived as legitimate (in terms of effectiveness and fairness)  the more it will possess 
the potential to elicit compliance without excessive monitoring or punitive action. See 
Margret Lev and Audrey Sacks (2009), Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators, 
Regulation & Governance (3), p. 311. 
16 David Beetham (1991), The Legitimation of Power. Palgrave MacMillan, p. 69-70 ff. and 
p. 91. 
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way of enforcement. The duty to implement17 and enforce laws is generally 
perceived as something required by the rule of law. Compliance fosters the 
basic trust people can have in the law, it reinforces the authority of the law 
and thereby its overall legitimacy. Although public authorities in the rule of 
law-based jurisdictions are under the obligation to implement law, and en-
force it if necessary, they do not have total discretion in doing so. Imple-
mentation and enforcement activities generally need to have a basis in law 
as well, and the law itself sets conditions for implementation. A legal prin-
ciple that is quite well known and common to most rule-of-law-based juris-
dictions is the ‘nulla poena sine lege priori’-principle entailing that no one 
shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omis-
sion which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or interna-
tional law at the time it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be im-
posed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was 
committed. This principle is enshrined in article 7 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), but also in article 15 of International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, and other documents. Closely related to 
this principle is the ‘lex certa’-principle which requires that – in particular 
criminal - offences must be clearly specified, that they must be foreseeable 
and that it must be possible to clearly determine, on the basis of the relevant 
legal provisions, the acts or omissions prohibited. Another principle derived 
from article 7 ECHR is the principle of non-retroactivity holding that an act 
cannot be designated as criminal by the courts if it has not been punishable 
previously, and the definition of existing criminal offences cannot be ex-
tended to acts which have not previously constituted an offence. It is not our 
aim here to give an exhaustive overview of legal requirements, principles 
and standards that are relevant for implementation and enforcement activi-
ties, but we will deal with two more that are especially relevant in ECHR 
and EU Member States. The first one is the proportionality-principle, requir-
ing that enforcement action (including sanctions) may not be disproportion-
ate to the goals served. Another important principle – especially in the EU 
context – requires that EU Member States act loyally and effectively when it 
comes to observing, implementing/enforcing EU law. EU Member States 
are under a legal obligation to implement and enforce EU law18 and  ECJ 
case law on enforceability  of EU law requires that penalties for violation 
                                                 
17 I use the term ‘implementation’ in a broad sense comprising of all efforts and activi-
ties involved in achieving the goals of legislation. These efforts cover a wide range of 
actions, ranging from issuing licenses, policing, inspecting, to enforcing (sanctioning, 
etc.). In my view enforcement, therefore, is a part of implementation.  
18 Art. 4 (3) Treaty of the European Union. 
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(of EU Law) should be effective, proportionate, non-discriminatory and 
dissuasive.19 Effectiveness requires that the set sanction furthers the goals 
set by the legislature, dissuasive – understood here in terms of deterrence – 
means that sanctions should be of such a type and magnitude that the ex-
pected costs are higher than expected benefits to the perpetrator, proportion-
ality requires that the sanctions are no severer than they strictly should be. 
Finally sanctions may not be discriminatory, meaning that conditions at-
tached to the national rules may not be less favourable than those attached to 
similar national actions. And second, the national rules may not be framed 
in a manner that would  render the exercise of Community rights virtually 
impossible. 
 
 
4. Enforcement strategies 
 
There is a substantial body of literature nowadays on enforcement and com-
pliance strategies.20 Most of the literature departs from the notion that regu-
latory agencies have considerable administrative discretion when carrying 
out their enforcement tasks.21 Even if we take into account that enforcement 
discretion is curtailed by legal standards (as we have seen in the former par-
agraph), this is a fair assessment of the position of regulatory agencies in 
most European countries. This leaves regulatory agencies – in broad terms – 
a choice of enforcement styles or strategies. There are basically two en-
forcement strategies (or styles). The first is the deterrence strategy which – 
in the words of Gunningham –  ‘emphasizes a confrontational style of en-
forcement and the sanctioning of rule-breaking behaviour. It assumes that 
those regulated are rational actors capable of responding to incentives, and 
that if offenders are detected with sufficient frequency and punished with 
sufficient severity, then they and other potential violators, will be deterred 
from violations in the future.’ 22  The compliance strategy on the other hand, 
seeks to prevent harm rather than punish it and focuses on cooperation be-
tween regulator, enforcement authority and addressee rather than confronta-
                                                 
19 ECJ C-68/88 Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2979 (Greek Corn-case). 
20 See for an overview e.g. Neil Gunningham (2010), Enforcement and Compliance 
Strategies, in: Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds.), The Oxford Hand-
book of Regulation. Oxford University Press, chapter 7 (p. 120-145) and Bronwen Mor-
gan &Karen Yeung (2007), An Introduction in Law and Regulation. Cambridge University 
Press, Chapter 4, p. 151-220. 
21 Gunningham (2010), p. 121. 
22 Gunningham (2010) ibid.  
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tion, and conciliation rather than coercion.23 Compliance strategies adhere 
to communication, bargaining and negotiating, using enforcement more or 
less as a mere threat, a big stick in the background. Recent research has 
shown that both strategies – in their basic form – are not very effective. Ba-
sically – though it does have a significant impact – the deterrence strategy is 
vulnerable with regard to the costs, incompetent or non-rational actors and it 
sometimes has counterproductive consequences (e.g. in the form of a ‘cul-
ture of regulatory resistance’).24 Compliance strategies on the other hand – 
although they encourage and facilitate those willing to comply with the law 
– are vulnerable to the strategic behaviour of those not wanting to comply 
voluntarily.25 What then is the best way to go? On the basis of game theory 
analysis, Scholz26 has demonstrated that a tit-for-tat (TFT) enforcement 
strategy most probably yield the best result.  A TFT strategy entails that the 
regulator refrains from a deterrent response so long the addressee is cooper-
ating, but when the addressee begins to exploit the cooperative posture of 
the regulator and cheats on compliance, then the regulator shifts from a co-
operative to a deterrent response. One way to operationalize this notion of a 
third way that lies between deterrence and cooperation is that of responsive 
regulation.27 Responsive regulation is an approach that encourages authori-
ties to read motivational postures, understand the sensibilities that shape 
them, and tailor a regulatory intervention accordingly. A carrot and stick 
approach, rewarding voluntary compliance and cooperation and punishing – 
if necessary – conscious and determined offenders. Ayres and Braithwaite 
have tried to come up with a mechanism to solve this problem, their so-
called Enforcement Pyramid.28 The pyramid departs from a cooperative 
stance with regard to non-compliance but gradually gears up to a more de-
terrent response if the desired compliance result is not forthcoming. 
 
                                                 
23 Gunningham (2010) ibid. 
24 Gunningham (2010), p. 139. 
25 Gunningham (2010) ibid. 
26 J. Scholz (1984), Deterrence, cooperation and the ecology of regulatory enforce-
ment, Law and Society Review (18), p. 179-224. 
27 I. Ayres, & J. Braithwaite, (1992). Responsive regulation. Transcending the deregulation 
debate. New York: Oxford University Press. 
28 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), p. 35.  
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The pyramid, at least the notion underlying it, is widely adopted in en-
forcement practice.  
 
Gunningham and Grabosky have noted that enforcement strategies that rely 
solely on  action by regulatory authorities do come with drawbacks when it 
comes down to costs and internalization – even when cooperative and deter-
rent elements are mixed. They have advocated the concept of ‘Smart regula-
tion’. Smart regulation – not to be confused with the EU better regulation 
strategy29 – refers to a form of regulatory pluralism that embraces flexible, 
imaginative and innovative forms of social control which seeks to harness 
not just government but also business and third parties. It uses self-
regulation and co-regulation, forms of private enforcement and a host of 
other policy instruments to improve the overall effectiveness of more con-
ventional forms of direct government action.30 A last enforcement strategy 
to be discussed here is the ‘meta-regulation’ or ‘meta-risk management’. 
This latter strategy involves the government not regulating directly to ward 
off risks (to health, safety, public order, markets, etc.) but rather more over-
seeing (risk-managing) the risk management of individual enterprises. In 
such a system government inspectors – when checking compliance – en-
courage industry to put an internal risk control and management system in 
place which is in turn scrutinized by regulators. It is the control and man-
                                                 
29 See the Smart Regulation Communication COM(2010) 543 final  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0543:FIN:EN:HTML last 
consulted on 7 February 2013.  
30 N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky, & D. Sinclair (1998), Smart Regulation, Designing Envi-
ronmental Policy. Oxford: Clarendon. 
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agement systems that are inspected rather than the actual behaviour of the 
enterprises.31  
 
Although the strategies mentioned here are very relevant to our topic, they 
do not answer the question as to how these strategies can be put to use when 
actually setting up and drafting legislation.  The literature at hand tends to 
focus on regulatory agencies and their strategies. What can be learnt from 
this that could be helpful to set up a course of action for the practice of leg-
islative drafting?  
 
 
5. Enforcement strategies in legislative and policy practice 
 
When it comes to regulation, the philosopher’s stone is of course: are there 
any failsafe compliance controls around in regulation and if so, where are 
they to be found? And, more so, how do you turn them on or off? Or up and 
down? These are highly relevant questions in times where there are frequent 
calls for higher and more stringent penalties and more intensive enforce-
ment as a means to combat regulatory non-compliance.   
 
How can one exert influence on regulatory compliance? According to a 
well-known recipe from the legislator’s cookery book, regulatory compli-
ance is primarily promoted through proper communication of the rules (pub-
lication, provision of information) and making an effort to ensure the ac-
ceptance of rules and to apply other methods that could contribute to volun-
tary or ‘spontaneous’ compliance with these rules.32 This is what we would 
obviously prefer and it chimes well with the theory and evidence that legit-
imation is the key to compliance (paragraph 3) and that mixed enforcement 
strategies, that start with investing in a persuasive compliance strategy, but 
can escalate the response as the situation may require, probably work best.  
 
Indeed in many cases regulators cannot simply rely on voluntary compli-
ance with rules, but need to do more. Especially when regulating cases in 
which non-compliance  may yield financial benefits, compliance monitoring 
(through forms of supervision or investigation) – according to wisdom 
                                                 
31 Gunningham (2010), p. 135-139.  
32 See, again, for example, the Dutch Table of 11.  
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gained through legislative practice - the threat and actual application of 
sanctions is necessary to ensure effective compliance.33  
 
The guiding notion in Dutch regulatory practice – which we will discuss 
here as an example – is that,  where a government makes extra efforts to 
ensure regulatory compliance − by exercising effective supervision and/or 
using private law, criminal law or administrative means of coercion (sanc-
tions) – this will increase regulatory compliance, more or less in a linear 
way.34 In the Netherlands, as in many other countries, the enforcement de-
bate has consequently been captured by discussion on the way government 
can and must step up its enforcement efforts and – in parallel – on the use of 
techniques and instruments by government agencies. As a result, toolboxes 
are rampant in Dutch public administration.  For the sake of the discussion 
we will label this line of reasoning as administrative logic. 
 
As we have seen, however, there is at best an uncertain relationship between 
enforcement efforts by government agencies on the one hand and their im-
pact on compliance on the other. If we want to predict the impact public 
enforcement efforts and instruments have on compliance it does not suffice 
to simply focus on toolboxes, strategies and techniques. As we have demon-
strated in the former paragraphs, any policy or strategy trying to improve 
regulatory compliance must not start with a discussion on the toolkit, but 
with an understanding  of why citizens and companies comply with rules 
and what role is played by enforcement efforts in this context. In other 
words, we should – when devising compliance policies – not merely rely on 
administrative logic but also think in terms of the logic of motives.35 
 
 
                                                 
33 On this subject, see also P. Eijlander and W. Voermans (2000), Wetgevingsleer (Legis-
lative drafting). Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague, p. 156 et seq.  
34 This approach can also be found in the case law of the European Court of Justice in 
which the Court sets out the enforcement principles in explicit terms. Reactions to 
non-compliance with EU rules must be effective, proportional, have a deterrent effect 
and satisfy the assimilation principle as it is called. See Eijlander & Voermans (2000), 
p. 288.  
35 Picking up on this latter line of thinking Van Gestel argues that regulatory policies – 
which include compliance policies  – could benefit from behavioural approaches to 
law and economics;  an increasingly important and relevant field of academic research. 
He bases his views on a.o. C. Jolls, C. Sunstein & R. Thaler (1998), A Behavioural  
Approach to Law and Economics, Stanford Law Review, (50) 1471, p. 1476; R.H. Thaler 
& C.R. Sunstein (2008), Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness. 
Yale University Press. See Van Gestel (2013), p. 25-26. 
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6. Enforcement debate in the Netherlands: the Michiels Commission 
 
Paying due attention to compliance motives, however, seems to be tough 
going in politics and policy making. Enforcement debates often utterly fail 
to deal with the effect caused by an enforcement incentive on the addressee 
but – in quite a one-sided fashion − they rather more address the question of 
what kind of enforcement incentive should be offered by what law enforce-
ment agency. This is – as we have seen - based on the axiom that enforce-
ment has a beneficial effect on compliance. Always and universally. The 
proof for this assumption is often found by pointing out the opposite: non-
enforcement in any case results in non-compliance or a greater chance of 
non-compliance. Keen observers will, of course, immediately recognize this 
reversal as a fallacy.  
 
Allow us to give an illustrative Dutch example. In the 1990s, the 
Dutch government was much concerned with so-called enforcement 
deficits, i.e. a situation of regulatory non-compliance in situations 
where there was a demonstrable existing enforcement capacity. Ob-
viously in these situations administrative capacity was – at the face 
of things – not well  aligned with the relevant needs. In order to tack-
le this problem the Government set up the Michiels Commission.36 
In its final report from 1998,37 this Commission, too, assumes the 
existence of the presumably beneficial but essentially unknown and 
unproved relationship between enforcement efforts and compliance. 
The commission adopts a risk-based approach, however, by stating 
that where there is no enforcement, the risk of non-compliance is 
substantial. Therefore the Commission advises , somewhat unsur-
prisingly, that in the case of non-compliance, administrative en-
forcement efforts should be intensified. Always. Compliance policies 
in the Netherlands followed suit. An action programme set up by the 
Dutch Government in response to the report − entitled Handhaven 
op niveau (‘Quality Enforcement’) − underlining the importance of 
strenuous administrative efforts. Better cooperation and ongoing pro-
fessionalization of enforcement efforts were supposed to result in po-
tential enforcement deficits being made up or reduced, the elimina-
                                                 
36 The Dutch Commission for Administrative and Private Law Enforcement (‘Mich-
iels Commission’). 
37 The Commission for Administrative and Private Law Enforcement, Handhaven op 
Niveau (‘Quality Enforcement’), Deventer, 1998, p. 47. 
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tion of the risks of non-compliance, and a potentially beneficial ef-
fect on compliance.38  
 
Dealing with risks in this way resembles homeopathy or the effects 
of aspirin: we assume that enforcement works; indeed, we know that 
it works, but we do not know how it works or the extent to which it 
works. And any physician will tell you that there is the risk of a 
wrong dose in cases like that.   
 
This administrative approach to the relationship between enforce-
ment and compliance can also be found in the evaluation report 
about the ‘yield’ of the ‘Quality Enforcement’ programme. At the 
closing conference of the programme, which was held in The Hague 
on 24 November 2006, the many successes of the programme were 
recalled. It was pointed out that since 1999, administrative bodies 
had devoted greater attention to the enforcement of statutory and 
other rules. The programme project monitor showed that by then, 83 
percent of Dutch municipalities had ‘a great deal of attention’ for 
enforcement. In specific policy fields – including compulsory edu-
cation and prostitution policy, for example, being policy fields that 
involved hardly any inspections five years ago − there was an in-
crease in inspection efforts from 20 to 70 percent. Special enforce-
ment programmes had been set up by 63 percent of the municipali-
ties. Five years before, it was claimed, not a single municipality had 
been engaged in such programmes. In addition, half of the munici-
palities had by 2006 identified the risks of disasters as a result of 
non-compliance with statutory rules.  
 
The Quality Enforcement programme also promoted the profession-
alization of enforcement and mutual cooperation between munici-
palities, provinces and water boards and cooperation with the police 
and inspection bodies. The Project Monitor from 2005 showed that 
these bodies had actually started to cooperate more closely, espe-
cially in the fields of the environment, public space enforcement, 
living conditions, fire safety and building control. According to 95 
percent of the Dutch municipalities in 2006, the Quality Enforce-
                                                 
38 See also the Government position paper on Handhaven op level, Parliamentary Papers II 
1999/2000, 26800 VI Adoption of the budget of the income and expenses of the 
Ministry of Justice (VI) for the year 2000, No. 67. 
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ment action programme had improved enforcement to a significant 
extent.39 
 
All of the results were expressed in terms of administrative efforts 
while little could be said apparently about the extent to which and the 
manner in which the enforcement incentive worked on actual compli-
ance. The principle effects of programme-based enforcement were 
primarily to be found in the area of awareness and risk control. In his 
letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, the Minister of the Inte-
rior at the time, Mr Remkes, was therefore not altogether convinced of 
the success of the programme, aside  the evidence produced by the 
evaluation report . He – quite realistically – stated that: 
 
‘Even though attention for specific topics (such as fire safety, 
outlying areas, compulsory education) has resulted in greater 
awareness, the practical contribution of 'Quality Enforcement’ 
is limited in many cases.  People’s opinions on the matter dif-
fer but many are critical. Its potential has not yet been realised 
in most cases.40 
 
 
7. Instruments of compliance: enforcement and sanctions 
 
7.1 The deterrent effect of punishment as a motive for regulatory compli-
ance 
 
But how then to use the enforcement capacity to good effect? As we have 
argued this requires some understanding of the effects of enforcement ef-
forts on regulatory compliance. As a first step we need to know something 
about the why of regulatory compliance.  As this is a wide-ranging issue, 
that cannot be dealt with to the full extent in this contribution,  we will re-
strict ourselves to the element of the effectiveness of sanctioning, and, in 
particular, to the threat of punishment.  Does the threat of punishment deter 
non-compliers, does it inspire them to comply with rules? And, for example, 
will higher penalties – as an expression of increased enforcement activity - 
                                                 
39 See www.rijksoverheid.nl/...en.../samenwerken-daar-zit-muziek-in.pdf  
40 Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Dutch House of Representatives, dated 6 
November 2006, offer of  evaluation of action programme ‘Quality Enforcement’, see 
http://www.justitie.nl/images/ evaluatie% 
20Handhaven%20op%20Niveau_6534_tcm34-25550.pdf. 
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be more effective than lower ones? For centuries, legal scholars have had 
disputes and debates on the question of whether penalties are an effective 
means to ensure regulatory compliance. In recent years  criminologists, le-
gal economists and forensic psychologists, in particular, have dealt with 
these issues. The participants in the debate are somewhat like doctors gath-
ered round a sickbed: there are many differences of opinion about the diag-
nosis and treatment, and there seems little prospect of any recovery.  
 
The debate is fierce at times. Certainly where recent research plays down 
the effects of punishment or more severe penalties, this occasionally triggers 
fierce reactions and  touches a raw nerve. A Dutch journalist, for example, 
wrote in an article entitled ‘More Severe Punishments Are Effective’ that 
our intuition, ‘our common sense’,41 tells us that more severe punishments 
are effective. Perhaps not because this is really the case, but because we 
think this should be the case. As a result, punishments and the threat of pun-
ishment are not only an instrumental but also a moral issue, not just for non-
compliers but also for compliers.   
 
7.2 Explanations for compliance and non-compliance  
 
It is not easy to explain why rules are complied with and what role punish-
ment plays in this respect. It is already a problem to define humans in this 
context. If we assume that humans are rational, calculating beings (homo 
economicus),42 punishments and threats of punishment that make the chance 
of a loss (sanction or another disadvantage) greater than the benefit gained 
as a result of any non-compliance are effective. According to this line of 
reasoning, stiffer penalties and an increased chance of being caught will 
deter potential non-compliers to a greater extent than lower penalties. The 
legislator could latch on to this by developing ‘compliance mathematics’.  
 
                                                 
41 From Henry Sturman (2003), ‘Zwaarder straffen werkt', Elsevier 17 January 2003, avail-
able on http://www.libertarian.nl/NL/archives/straffen.pdf. 
42 ‘Econs’ as Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call them. But recent research shows that 
human (market) behaviour is not only guided by reason and logic but also by ‘predict-
able’ irrational choices. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler (1998) as cited by Van Gestel 
(2013), p. 25-26. 
Wim Voermans 
 56 
In 1994, the Dutch economist Van Velthoven conducted an amusing 
study of the economy of crime and punishment.43 Based on the ref-
erence year 1990, he made a calculation of the expected punishment 
and benefits per crime for the Dutch situation. The clear-up rate for 
the crimes registered by the police was 22.3 percent in the Nether-
lands at the time.44 The Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) 
estimate however that the actual number of crimes committed 
against private individuals (6.3 million) and institutions and compa-
nies (5.4 million) actually is ten times higher than the number of the 
registered crimes. On that basis Van Velthoven calculated that the 
actual chance of being caught for a crime in the Netherlands was 
only about 2.2 percent. If we take into consideration that only six 
percent of the criminals caught were given a prison sentence, this 
results in an actual chance of imprisonment of 1 out of 758 per 
crime committed. In addition to imprisonment, fines were imposed, 
but these were very low, too. Van Velthoven’s final conclusion is 
that the expected threat of punishment per crime equals a fine of on-
ly NLG 3.60 (approx. €1.50 present-day value) plus four hours’ im-
prisonment. On the other hand, the expected benefits per crime were 
more than NLG 400 (approx. €180). If the financial implications are 
assessed in more general terms, crime benefited everyone who 
earned less than NLG 100 (approx. € 45) per hour in a normal job in 
1990. That is to say, more than 95% of the population. 45 
 
The present-day figures for the Netherlands will probably be a little more 
favourable, though perhaps not significantly different. According to the cal-
culations of Van Velthoven’s study, a calculating person – econs –  will 
always consider non-compliance to be the more advantageous option. And 
yet, most citizens are law-abiding people. Why? 
 
Perhaps, this is because we are all different. It is a fact of life that there are 
good guys and bad guys. Threat of punishment would then be especially 
effective for calculating and prospective criminals. This may also be con-
nected with the fact that citizens and companies do not calculate their 
                                                 
43 He reiterates the method of calculation and outcomes in his newest book. B. C.J. 
van Velthoven (2012), Economie van misdaad en straf (The Economy of Crime and 
Punishment). Boom Lemma Publishers, p. 39-44.  
44 The clear-up rate did improve somewhat over time, at present (2013) it is about 
25%. 
45 Source that reported on the research Het Parool (a Dutch newspaper) 28 June 2002. 
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chances in this simple manner, but include more factors in their calculation 
than the mere threat of punishment and the chance of being caught.46 These 
factors include reputation, the information at hand (most people do not 
know the sanctions or the exact figures of the chance of being caught, etc.), 
culture, morality,47 the subjective chance of being caught. As Van 
Velthoven in his latest book argues, it is not the objective chance of being 
caught that is most important to prospective delinquents but the subjective 
chance of it, i.e. the chance of being caught as the prospective delinquent 
perceives it.48 
 
In recent years, Henk Elffers, a forensic psychologist, has tried to address 
these questions as well. In 1997, Elffers, together with Hessing, examined 
the role of the threat of punishment related to compliance with tax legisla-
tion (income tax).49 They drew the following remarkable conclusions:   
 
• Statutory sanctions are ineffective for – what they call − the conformist 
compliers, i.e. those who comply with rules only because they fear 
punishment. There is only an effect if – and that does not seem 
feasible, and perhaps not desirable either – the punishment threatened 
is certain, quick and severe. 
• Statutory sanctions have an indirect effect on the identifiers, those who 
comply with rules because they want to belong to a social group for 
which compliance is the norm; imposing sanctions on the 
others, those who break the rules, is necessary and useful for the 
identifiers, because this serves to maintain the social norm for them, 
the norm that keeps them on the straight and narrow.  
• Statutory sanctions are superfluous for the internalisers, those who 
comply with rules because they have made these rules part of their 
own world view. 
 
That the threat of punishment has an indirect effect on identifiers is an 
important  research finding, which is also confirmed in other recent studies, 
like the one conducted by the Swede Lennart Wittberg in his contribution to 
                                                 
46 On this subject, see H. Elffers (2005), De rationele regelovertreder (The Rational Delin-
quent), inaugural address for Antwerp University, 26 October  2004, Boom Legal 
Publishers. 
47 Van Velthoven (2012), p. 49-52. 
48 Van Velthoven (2012), p. 41. 
49 See Henk Elffers and Dick J. Hessing (1997), Het nut van sanctions (The Useful-
ness of Sanctions), Ars Aequi (Dutch Student Law Magazine), 46, p. 490-496. 
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the recent conference publication entitled Managing and maintaining 
compliance.50 He concludes from his experiences of Swedish tax legislation 
that punishment voices a significant signal. The importance of that signal 
does not primarily lie in the deterrence of the prospective non-complier but in 
the fact that the punishment of non-compliers confirms the existence and 
operation of rules to those other than the non-complier. Punishment impresses 
the relevant rule on the minds of people and programmes our willingness to 
comply with rules. In other words: a sort of bandwagon-effect exists as 
regards regulatory compliance. 
 
7.3 Differential Attributions 
 
This pattern is also confirmed by Catherine Anderson and John Darley, who 
published a report in the Journal for Applied Social Psychology in 2002 about 
four experiments in which they asked respondents about their motives for 
complying with rules. The interesting aspect is that, even if they are notorious 
non-compliers, many of these respondents indicate that they themselves are 
restrained from non-compliance as a result of internal factors (morality, 
internalisation) and not because of the supposed consequences of non-
compliance. However, and this brings us to the crux of the matter: they do 
assume at the same time that others – certainly other non-compliers – are 
probably restrained from non-compliance only because of the risk of 
punishment or the consequences (external factors).51 In other words, a 
‘distrust model’, which is well in line with the ‘arrangement nature’ that 
underlies the law and the confidence that parties under the law derive from 
that. Accordingly, punishment and the threat of punishment are primarily 
intended to ensure that others will adhere to the arrangement made.    
The survey conducted by Anderson and Darley is particularly amusing if the 
results are applied to legislators. Let us assume, for the sake of convenience, 
that these are just ordinary people, too. If this is so, they will probably devise 
punishment threats which they believe they do not need themselves but which 
will deter others. Yet, these threats do not deter others very much because the 
experiment shows that deterrence through the threat of punishment is not the 
principal motive for compliance. 
                                                 
50 Lennart Wittberg (2006), Can Communication Activities Improve Compliance?, in: 
H. Elffers, P. Verboon and W. Huisman (ed.) Managing and Maintaining Compliance, 
Boom Legal Publishers; The Hague 2006, p. 25-43. 
51 Catherine A. Sanderson and John M. Darley (2002), I Am Moral, but You Are De-
terred: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 2002, 32, 2, p. 375-405. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
What can we learn from all this ? Quite a lot you would think, but not much 
that can be used for ready-made toolboxes that might be helpful in designing 
effective compliance strategies and policies. It does, however, make one 
reconsider whether stepping up enforcement activity or stiffening sanctions as 
a reaction to non-compliance, will automatically deliver a better result. There 
is even some disheartening evidence to the contrary. In answer to the 
question: ‘Does criminal law deter?’ Robinson’s and Darley’s short answer is 
‘no’ if we consider the behavioural science data.52 Especially attempts at 
engineering criminal law rules to achieve heightened deterrence effects are 
generally ineffective social science research suggests. Potential offenders 
commonly do not know the legal rules, either directly or indirectly, even 
those rules that have been explicitly formulated to produce a behavioural 
effect, Robinson and Darley conclude.53 And even if they know the legal 
rules, potential offenders commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge 
to bear to guide their conduct in their own best interests, such failure 
stemming from a variety of social, situational, or chemical influences.54  
Does this mean that all hope is lost for legislators and enforcement agencies 
when they try to effect behaviour and guide it in some way or other? 
Certainly not. We have seen that strategies that take the motives of addressees 
of the rules into account, that capitalize on these motives or ‘beliefs’55 (e.g. by 
way of nudges or reflecting a deeper understanding of why addressees will of 
will not comply with rules) may generally produce a better result.  
A second conclusion that follows from the analysis is that administrative 
enforcement efforts do not – at least not automatically – equate compliance 
rates. There is not a one-on-one relation here, although this idea seems to be 
underpinning some present-day enforcement strategies. Enforcement efforts 
                                                 
52 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley (2004), Does Criminal Law Deter?; A Behav-
ioural Science Investigation, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 42, 2, p. 173-205.  
53 Robinson & Darley (2004), p. 204. 
54 Robinson & Darley (2004), ibid. 
55 See Margaret Levi and Audrey Sacks, Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators, 
Regulation & Governance 2009, 3, p. 311-333. Levi and Sacks demonstrate that there is 
reason to believe that the more effective a government is in serving its citizens, or is 
perceived to be (addition WV), the more likely it is to produce a virtuous cycle of citi-
zens compliance with its extractions, leading to better government and greater com-
pliance. Levi & Sacks (2009), p. 328. 
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are but one of the many norm-support cues to comply.56 We do know there is 
a relationship between administrative enforcement efforts and compliance, 
but we do not know precisely how it works. Enforcement efforts, in other 
words, work like aspirin57 on compliance. This sobering truth has not kicked 
in everywhere still. We still have great confidence in administrative 
enforcement efforts as a means – in a lot of cases as the single method – to 
promote compliance. In sum we can conclude that in many cases the threat of 
punishment does not directly as a motive for regulatory compliance. 
Punishment and the threat of punishment have an indirect effect on regulatory 
compliance. Recent research also suggests that a sort of bandwagon-effect 
exists as regards regulatory compliance.58 Compliant behaviour, or 
enforcement activities that reminds us of (or merely point out) the existence 
of a norm, prompt (more) compliant behaviour. And finally, we believe, these 
insights may act as a wake-up call for the ill-advised, ‘received’ wisdom – so 
prominently at the heart of a lot of government enforcement and compliance 
strategies nowadays –  that it is easy to guarantee compliance by adopting a 
system of sanction-based compliance mathematics that allow us to calculate 
the compliance outcome by merely adding up (and mixing) administrative 
action. 
 
 
Annex Table of 11 
 
In 1994, the Dutch Ministry of Justice studied the possibility of periodically 
monitoring the level of compliance with legislation. In the course of that 
project the ‘Table of Eleven’ originated. The ‘Table of Eleven’ is a model 
based on behavioural sciences, consisting of eleven dimensions. Together, 
these dimensions are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation. 
The eleven dimensions are formulated with a view to as high a practicability 
as possible in the fields of policy making and law enforcement. The dimen-
sions provide criteria with which we can assess whether or not it is possible 
                                                 
56 See the PhD-research of Kees Keizer, The Spreading of Disorder, PhD-thesis Universi-
ty of Groningen, Groningen 2010. Keizer’s research shows that compliant behaviour 
of norm addressees is greatly influenced by the fact whether or not they observe care 
and respect of others (fellow citizens) for these and indeed more generally other norms. 
Keizer (2010), p. 90. 
57 A popular and effective painkiller, prescribed and used for decades although we did 
not understand exactly how it worked until quite recently. 
58 E.g. Keizer (2010). 
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to enforce draft legislation. These criteria, however, can also be used to 
evaluate existing legislation. 
 
In subsequent  years, the ‘Table of Eleven’ was refined and improved. In 
addition, we gained the necessary experience in using it. These days, the 
‘Table of Eleven’ is a household name among policy makers, jurists drafting 
legislation, supervisors and enforcers within the Dutch government. 
 
See 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:PtkFrvWH10EJ:www.sam.g
ov.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/item_618_NL_The_table_of_Eleven.pdf+
The+%E2%80%98Table+of+Eleven%E2%80%99&hl=nl&gl=nl&pid=bl&
srcid=ADGEESii3iRDI3MyUHEJG4YoPbaG-
gBUTYoqEWFvFMAoI7sEoee8C7-
rjBqY4XJw1zG1Qqsq9BDmPojqSCDjquHRe2xvcHQjFbtrrYnv1qqbLmJS
Ktn2H4QgaoKi576rC_TW1jI8Fl2v&sig=AHIEtbSssJkidJ-
kE59FcEPhZbH7bs154g  
